Increasing affordability of genome sequencing and, as a consequence, widespread availability of genomic data opens up new opportunities for the field of medicine, as also evident from the emergence of popular cloud-based offerings in this area, such as Google Genomics. To utilize this data more efficiently, it is crucial that different entities share their data with each other. However, such data sharing is risky mainly due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we attempt to provide a privacypreserving and efficient solution for the "similar patient search" problem among several parties (e.g., hospitals) by addressing the shortcomings of previous attempts. We consider a scenario in which each hospital has its own genomic dataset and the goal of a physician (or researcher) is to search for a patient similar to a given one (based on a genomic makeup) among all the hospitals in the system. To enable this search, we let each hospital encrypt its dataset with its own key and outsource the storage of its dataset to a public cloud. The physician can get an authorization from multiple hospitals and send a query to the cloud, which efficiently performs the search across authorized hospitals using a privacy-preserving index structure. We propose a hierarchical index structure to index each hospital's dataset with low memory requirement. Furthermore, we develop a novel privacy-preserving index merging mechanism that generates a common search index from individual indices of each hospital to significantly improve the search efficiency. We also consider the storage of medical information associated with genomic data of a patient (e.g., diagnosis and treatment). We allow access to this information via a fine-grained access control policy that we develop through the combination of standard symmetric encryption and ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption. Using this mechanism, a physician can search for similar patients and obtain medical information about the matching records if the access policy holds. We conduct experiments on large-scale genomic data and show the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Notably, we show that under our experimental settings, the proposed scheme is more than 60 times faster than Wang et al.'s protocol [37] and 97 times faster than Asharov et al.'s solution [5] .
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the sharp cost reduction in the whole genome sequencing, today, digital genomes are used in many applications such as paternity tests [30] , personalized medicine [39] , and genetic compatibility tests [21] . Among these uses of genomic data, arguably the most important one is in healthcare. Physicians now treat their patients based on their genetic makeup. They provide different prescriptions to patients having the same disease but with different genetic makeup. Thus, it is very valuable for a physician to identify other patients that are in similar conditions to their patient to get more insight about the diagnosis and treatment procedures. However, doing such a search in a broad fashion (e.g., nation-wide) has many unique challenges as we discuss in the following. Confidentiality of genomic data and affiliated sensitive information (ASI). There has already been several privacy concerns raised related to genomic data [22] , [33] . Since genomic data includes information about an individual's phenotype, ethnicity, family members, disease conditions, and more, if it falls into wrong hands, the consequences may be as serious as genetic discrimination (e.g., in healthcare or employment). Genomic data is often associated with the medical condition of a patient, including diagnosis, treatment, and symptoms. We refer to this information as "affiliated sensitive information" (ASI) of the patient. For instance, a mutation in the BRCA gene is recognized as a major contributor for breast cancer [17] , similarly the treatment of many cancer types are determined based on the genetic makeup of a patient. Protecting the confidentiality of patients' genomic data and ASI is essential for the hospitals, and hence, hospitals are not willing to open their datasets to each other or share their datasets with a public cloud service provider (CSP). Therefore, genomic data sharing mechanisms that provide privacy guarantees to the hospitals about their datasets are required to pave the way to an efficient and privacy-preserving nation-wide similar patient search protocol. Efficiency of the search process. The search process to identify a target genome sequence (i.e., a similar patient) should be efficient. However, considering the scale of genomic data and the scale of the search (i.e., number of hospitals and the number of patients in each hospital), providing an efficient protocol along with the privacy goals is not trivial. One obvious approach is to apply index structures (e.g., suffix tree, prefix tree, or binary tree) to make the search process more efficient. However, such indexing techniques cannot be directly applied for the genome search due to (i) size of genomic data, (ii) variation of genomic data between individuals (e.g., mutations), and (iii) the aforementioned privacy requirements. Thus, new techniques are required to provide both privacy guarantees and efficiency for similar patient search problem. Search over several parties. Searching for similar patients is more effective and helpful if the physician can search datasets of more hospitals. Previous studies assume the physician to query all hospitals individually (one-by-one), however such a strategy is both time consuming and unreliable since it requires the cooperation of each hospital in real-time. Instead, it would be easier if all hospitals outsource their datasets to a common entity (e.g., a CSP) and the physician directly queries this CSP. However, such an approach is not trivial due to privacy concerns. Furthermore, as new hospitals join the system, or as the datasets of the existing hospitals change, data stored at the CSP should be updated and this may cause additional cost. Therefore, we need new solutions to share datasets among several hospitals in a privacy-preserving and efficient way.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we propose the first framework to tackle all these challenges. We propose a scheme in which each hospital encrypts its own dataset (with its unique key) and outsources the storage and processing for the search operation to a CSP. For privacy, we encrypt genomic data with a standard encryption algorithm and propose a novel indexing mechanism for privacy-preserving search. In the proposed scheme, each genome sequence is first indexed using a Bloom filter and then the positions of nonzero elements in the Bloom filter are extracted, encrypted, and randomized through a keyed pseudorandom function (PRF). The result is eventually remapped to a customized Bloom filter for efficient comparison during the search. This design choice provides not only privacy, but also the ability to search over several hospitals' datasets in an efficient way. Each hospital encrypts its own dataset independently while the searchability of ciphertext is enabled across all the hospitals through this indexing mechanism.
In order to achieve efficient search and outsource computation-intensive tasks to the CSP, we propose two mechanisms to advance the proposed indexing scheme. First, we propose a hierarchical clustering algorithm and a hierarchical index structure to accelerate the search process. The CSP first builds a similarity matrix of Bloom filters based on cosine similarity. Using the similarity matrix, the CSP applies traditional hierarchical clustering algorithm to cluster them. Depending on the outcome of clustering, the CSP builds a hierarchical index which consists of two parts: named tree and dictionary. The tree maintains the hierarchical structure while the dictionary stores the data of the index. The tree requires to be stored in the memory during the service phase while the dictionary is stored on the disk. Second, we introduce a privacy-preserving index merging algorithm to avoid CSP sequentially searching over all the stored hierarchical index structures (e.g., belonging to different hospitals) one-by-one. To do this, all the leaves of stored indices are recycled and gathered into a set. Afterwards, the CSP invokes the hierarchical clustering algorithm and reconstructs a new index using this set.
To enable the ASI to be properly accessible by legitimate clients, we introduce an ASI sharing scheme. Considering the fine-grained access requirement, we adopt chosen policy attribute-based encryption (CPABE). However, the large size of ASI prohibits CPABE to be applied directly. Thus, in the proposed ASI sharing scheme, the ASI is encrypted by advanced encryption standard (AES) in two layers. The key of the outer layer is encrypted by CPABE while the key of the inner layer is assigned to the legitimate clients by the data owner (e.g., corresponding hospital). The key of outer layer is properly selected to map to a certain segment of the genome sequence. In addition, to enable participants to use different secret keys to encrypt the ASI, we introduce a re-encryption mechanism. Thus, if a hospital shares its ASI with a client (physician), a shared key is generated and sent to the CSP. The CSP converts the submitted raw query into a valid query through the shared key. The valid query can be further used to search for the target ASIs. In the proposed scheme, we do not set a constraint on the number of ASIs for each patient and all the ASIs of a retrieved patient is sequentially checked in the ASI search phase. We implement and evaluate the proposed scheme under various scenarios. Also, we show that compared with the state-of-the-art, the proposed scheme performs more than 60 times faster than Wang et al.'s protocol [37] and 97 times faster than Asharov et al.'s scheme [5] , especially for large query sizes.
II. RELATED WORK Privacy of genomic data has been recently a very active research topic [31] . Several privacy-preserving solutions have been proposed for processing of genomic data in different settings, including personalized medicine [9] , research [25] , [29] , alignment [14] , and management of raw genomic data [7] .
There has been many earlier work on privacy-preserving pairwise comparison of genomes (or identification of a pattern in a given DNA sequence). Atallah et al. proposed a privacypreserving edit distance protocol based on dynamic programming [6] . Computational efficiency of this work was later improved by Jha et al. [24] . Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. proposed a protocol to execute finite state machine (FSM) in an oblivious manner [35] . Yasuda et al. applied somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) to implement privacy-preserving Hamming distance computation of two genome sequences [40] . Cheon et al. used SWHE to implement secure edit distance computation of two genome sequences [16] . Wang et al. proposed a scheme for DNA sequence matching with only one-round of interaction [36] . Sousa et al. combined SWHE and private information retrieval (PIR) to implement secure search over outsourced VCF files [34] . Cheng et al. proposed secret sharing (using two non-colluding public clouds) for similarity computation between genome sequences [15] . Although these schemes are useful for pairwise comparison of genomes (or comparison of a pattern and a genome), they cannot be generalized for 1-to-n comparison between the genomes easily due to efficiency and practicality issues, and hence they are not applicable for the similar patient search problem.
Similar to our proposed work, privacy-preserving similar patient search has been considered by a few works. Wang et al. proposed an efficient genome-wide, privacy-preserving similar patient query scheme for two parties [37] . In their scheme, the edit distance of two genome sequences is transformed into finding the number of different elements between two sets. Asharov et al. addressed the same problem by pre-processing genome sequences into proper fragments before comparison. Both these works assume that genomic data is stored at local datasets (e.g., each hospital storing its own genomic dataset) and the client (physician) looks for the top k-closest sequences at each local dataset. This makes the search process impractical since both schemes require each hospital to be available all the time and responsive to the queries.
Our contribution. As opposed to previous work, here, we provide a significantly more practical and efficient solution by letting the hospitals outsource the storage of their datasets to a cloud service provider (CSP) in a privacy-preserving way. To provide the privacy of outsourced data to the CSP, we let each data owner (hospital) encrypt its data with its unique cryptographic key. Thus, as opposed to similar work that use a CSP, we avoid single point-of-failure by encrypting all the outsourced data with different keys. We also consider a dynamic system in which new hospitals join by uploading their datasets to the CSP in an efficient way. We provide these functionalities via a novel indexing scheme and a novel privacy-preserving index merging algorithm. Our evaluation results on real genomic data shows that the proposed scheme provides more than 60 times better performance (in terms of run-time) than Wang et al.'scheme [37] and 120 times better performance than Asharov et al.'s work [5] , especially for large query sizes (e.g., including large number of SNPs).
Furthermore, we consider controlled access to affiliated sensitive information (ASI) such as diagnosis, treatment, or symptoms that can be associated with genomic information. We provide fine-grained access control to ASI so that an authorized physician can not only identify similar patients but she can also obtain medical information about them.
III. BACKGROUND
Here, we provide brief background information about genomics and less-common cryptographic primitives we use in this work. We provide the background about more common primitives such as asymmetric bilinear groups and Bloom filters in Appendix A.
A. Genomics Background
The most common mutation in human population is called single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). It is the variation in a single nucleotide at a particular position of the genome [32] . There are about 5 million SNPs observed per individual and sensitive information about individuals (such as disease predispositions) are typically inferred by analyzing the SNPs. Two kinds of nucleotides (or alleles) are observed for each SNP: (i) major allele is the one that is observed with a high frequency and (ii) minor allele is the one that is observed with low frequency. The frequency of the minor allele in a given population is denoted as the minor allele frequency (MAF). Each SNP includes two nucleotides, one inherited from the father and the other one from mother. For simplicity, we represent the value of a SNP i as the number of its minor alleles, and hence i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. A SNP is represented by an (ID, value) pair, where the ID is taken from a large standardized set of strings and the value is in {0, 1, 2}. In the following sections, if we mention a SNP (or SNPs) without mentioning the ID or value, we mean both parts.
B. Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE)
CPABE enables controlled access to encrypted data [10] . It consists of the following four algorithms. Setup. Outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK i given a security parameter. Encrypt(PK, M, A). Takes as input public parameters PK, a message M , and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. The algorithm encrypts M and produces a ciphertext CT such that only a client that possesses a set of attributes that satisfy the access structure A can decrypt CT. Key Generation(MK i , S). Outputs a private key sk given the master key MK i and a set of attributes S. Decrypt(PK, CT, sk). Takes as input public parameters PK, a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy A, and sk, which is a private key for a set S of attributes. If S satisfies the access structure A, then the algorithm decrypts the ciphertxt CT and returns a message M.
C. Customized Bloom Filter
Compared with the standard Bloom filter (BF), the customized Bloom filter (CBF) uses one perfect hash function instead of k normal hash functions. The perfect hash function [20] for a set of data items is a hash function that maps distinct elements in the set to a set of integers with no collisions. These integers are further utilized as indices of a bit array and corresponding values are set to 1. In the remaining of the paper, if we do not specify the type of the Bloom filter, then it is the standard one. Fig. 1 : System model. The certificated institution (CI) is responsible for sequencing the submitted samples. The data owner (DO) (e.g., hospital) processes its data and outsources it to the cloud service provider (CSP). If a client wants to access the outsourced data, she needs to get authorization from the DO(s). After obtaining the authorization from the DO, the client sends a request to the CSP for target data. The CSP processes the request and sends the result to the client.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here, we introduce our system model, threat model, and the query model.
A. System Model
As shown in Figure 1 , our proposed model consists of four entities: data owner (DO), certificated institution (CI), cloud service provider (CSP), and client (e.g., physician). The DO can be considered as the hospital. The hospital collects biological samples from patients with their consent and sends the samples to the CI for sequencing. The CI is an authority or trusted institution that is responsible for sequencing DNA and generating the VCF files (the file format to store the SNPs of individuals). Existence of such a CI is required in today's sequencing technology and it has been commonly used in previous work as well [7] , [8] . Upon receiving VCF files from the CI, hospital first processes them (e.g., generating the complementing ASI, indexing, and encryption) and then, outsources the storage of the encrypted dataset to the CSP. The CSP stores the uploaded encrypted datasets and responds to the queries of the clients for similar patient search. After a client is authenticated by a hospital (e.g., to make sure that she is a legitimate physician), she can issue a query to the CSP to search over the stored data belonging to the corresponding hospital(s). Upon receiving the search result from the CSP, the client further processes the retrieved result and obtains the plaintext response.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the CI is a trusted party, which is consistent with the previous work [7] , [8] . The CSP is assumed to be semi-honest. This means the CSP follows the protocol honestly and is curious to infer stored data by analyzing the received queries and the stored data. Hospitals may be curious about the client's queries. Similarly, client may be curious about hospitals' sensitive information (genomic information and ASI stored at the CSP). We also assume parties do not collude with each other. We briefly discuss the main threats against the proposed protocol in the following.
Ciphertext attack. The CSP may attempt to infer the sensitive information of the hospitals by analyzing stored encrypted data. Query attack. The CSP observes and processes the query from the client, and hence it may try to infer the query content (i.e., genomic data of the patient being queried). Illegitimate access attack. The client may try to access genomic data or ASI from a hospital's dataset without the authorization of the corresponding hospital.
C. Query Model
The query model is designed to provide the following functionality: given a (partial) sequence of SNPs representing a set of mutations for a patient, retrieve ASIs of patients whose mutations are similar to those of the given sequence. The input sequence does not need to include all mutations for a patient because the focus on the query can be on a specific pattern that includes a number of SNPs. The search is performed across the data from multiple hospitals under the constraint of access control.
To prevent the CSP from learning the SNPs in the query input, the client transforms the input in the following way. First, the client creates a Bloom filter and populates this filter with each input SNP. Then, the client extracts the positions of non-zero elements inside the Bloom filter and applies a pseudorandom function to each extracted position using a secret key as the seed. The result of this operation is used for the index search. Second, the client creates a query token for each input SNP by applying a hash function and encrypting the hash output with her private key. The outcome of this is used for the ASI search. We present the details of these operations in Section V-C and discuss their privacy in Section VI. We also let the client customize the search query by introducing two search parameters as follows:
The threshold for similarity metric (ε c ). Since each client c may require a different level of similarity for a match, c should be allowed to set its own minimum acceptable similarity value. In the proposed scheme, the threshold for similarity metric is equivalent to the minimum similarity score of the cosine metric. In the search phase, it is used to evaluate whether the match for a patient exceeds the threshold. The threshold for the number of retrieved results (k c ). The number of retrieved result is not predictable. Considering the constraints on the client's capacity, bandwidth, and personal preference, a client should be allowed to set the maximum number for the retrieved result. In the proposed scheme, this parameter is used to control the size of search result.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME A. Overview
In order to perform similarity search, we use an index produced by hierarchical clustering. Being an expensive procedure, it is performed by the cloud in an offline fashion. Due to privacy concerns, the cloud cannot build the index from scratch using the plaintext records. Therefore, a hospital first creates an encrypted index and sends it to the cloud, which subsequently performs hierarchical clustering. Additionally, the cloud needs to combine indices sent by different hospitals because a single query can search across multiple hospitals. The cloud can either keep and search individual hospital indices separately or merge them into a single index. Using individual indices may be more efficient when there are only a few hospitals whereas at a larger scale, it is better to merge indices. The cloud uses a heuristic in order to determine which scheme to employ.
We divide the solution into three phases: initialization, client authorization, and query processing, as shown in Figures 2, 3, 4, respectively. The initialization is performed once, before making the service available to the clients. The client authorization can be performed periodically, in line with common practices. The query processing is performed each time a user wants to send a search query. Each phase consists of a number of procedures, which are also summarized in Table IX in Appendix B. We first present an overview of the procedures and then, provide their detailed descriptions.
In the initialization phase (shown in Figure 2 ), each hospital first calls the Setup function. Setup chooses the initial parameters, configures library functions, and then preprocesses the dataset (e.g., by adding ASI to associated SNPs).
After performing Setup, each hospital runs the IndexGen algorithm to build an index over its genomic data. The index is generated based on the genome similarity of its patients. Then, the encryption algorithms SNPEncrypt and ASIEncrypt are called to encrypt the genome sequences and corresponding ASIs. To outsource the computation-intensive tasks to the CSP, the hospital directly sends the generated index and encrypted data to the CSP without building a hierarchial index over it. Upon receiving the encrypted index, the CSP runs the Hierar-chicalIndexGen algorithm to build a hierarchical index in order to improve the search efficiency. Since each hospital outsources its indices to the CSP, the number of hierarchical indices stored at the CSP increases with the number of hospitals. If the number of hierarchical indices is beyond a certain threshold (that is determined by considering the efficiency of the search operation), the CSP calls the IndexMerge function to merge all the hierarchical indices into one. We further analyze the value of this threshold in Section VII.
If a client wants to perform a similar patient search, she first need to get authorization from a hospital before she can generate a valid query. Figure 3 shows the process of client authorization. The client sends an authorization request to a hospital. If the hospital approves the request, it generates a key for token adjustment and sends it to the CSP. Then, the hospital sends additional secret keys to the client, as described in Section V-C. If the hospital approves the request, a token adjustment key is generated and sent to the CSP in addition to a successful authorization reply that is sent to the client.
Once the client gets the authorization from a hospital, she can query the dataset of that hospital. An important advantage of our scheme is that the client can get an authorization from multiple hospitals and later send a single query to perform a search across all of them. Figure 4 shows the flow of query processing. The client first calls the QueryGen function to generate the first part of her query, which is used to search for the pseudonyms of the target similar patients. Then, the TokenGen function is called to construct tokens as the second part of the query, which is used to retrieve the target ASIs. Token is constructed by encrypting client's input SNPs and it is adjusted using the token adjustment key (that is generated by the hospital and sent to the CSP). The adjusted token is used to provide controlled (or authorized) access to the client to the hospital's data. Upon receiving the query, the CSP first calls either Search or SearchOverMergedIndex function, depending on whether the algorithm IndexMerge has been called or not with the first part of the query to retrieve the pseudonyms of target similar patients. If the output of the first step is non-empty, the CSP adjusts the token using the second part of the query by running TokenAdjust. Finally, the CSP calls the ASISearch function to retrieve the ASIs belonging to the retrieved target patients. The result is sent back to the client. The client decrypts the received ciphertext by running ASIDecrypt and obtains the plaintext ASIs of the corresponding target patients.
B. Initialization
As shown in Figure 2 , the initialization consists of six modules: Setup, IndexGen, SNPEncrypt, ASIEncrypt, Hierar-chicalIndexGen, and IndexMerge. The first four modules are done at each hospital and the remaining modules are done at the CSP. To initialize the system, a trusted party that is in charge of key generation and distribution (such as the NIH) sets an asymmetric bilinear group (G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, e), where G 1 and G 2 are two distinct groups of order p, and e is the mapping from these two groups to the target group G T . In addition, the settings (i.e., size and maximum false positive rate) of the standard Bloom filter BF and customized Bloom filter CBF are configured. After that, three hash functions (H 0 , H 1 , H 2 ) are chosen. These hash functions are used in the algorithms that will be discussed later. Subsequently, a pseudorandom function (PRF) F is chosen and a secret key K is selected. We list the frequently used parameters and functions in Table I . 1) Setup (at the hospital) -Setup: In the first step of the Setup, all the initial parameters and functions are selected. In the second step, dataset is preprocessed.
The following steps are the same for all hospitals, and hence we describe them only for an hospital i. Hospital i first generates two symmetric encryption keys, K αi and K βi for the SNP encryption and ASI encryption, respectively. Then, it chooses a secret key K i for the shared key generation. Furthermore, a public/private key pair (PK i,1 , SK i ) is generated for the signature and a public/master key pair (PK i,2 , MK i ) is generated for CPABE.
Next, the hospital starts preprocessing the dataset. The two phases of dataset preprocessing are shown in Figure 5 . In the first phase, the hospital adds a pseudonym for each patient record and ASIs for various groups of SNPs. The association between the ASIs and the SNPs can be determined based on several factors such as disease, phenotype, or treatment. Eventually, data record belonging to a patient ID i is rep-
IDi,SNP represents a set of SNPs of individual ID i (and their values) that are associated with ASI k . In the second phase, the concatenation of each SNP ID (represented by SNP.ID) and SNP value (represented by SNP.val) is mapped into a Bloom filter, denoted as bf IDi . This is also shown in Figure 7 . Fig. 5 : Dataset preprocessing. The pair of SNP ID and value is first classified based on a certain property (e.g., its association with a disease) and then associated with an ASI. Afterwards, the concatenation of SNP.ID and value is inserted into a Bloom filter. This generates the non-zero elements of the Bloom filter associated with ASIs.
Eventually, this process generates the non-zero elements of the Bloom filter output that are associated with the ASIs of the corresponding patient.
2) Index generation (at the hospital) -IndexGen: Each hospital indexes the records of its patients using a Bloom filter. The index generation algorithm is used to encrypt and randomize the non-zero elements of the Bloom filter. The same algorithm is also used to generate the query (as discussed in Section V-D1). The details of the index generation (IndexGen) algorithm are given in Appendix F. The input of the IndexGen algorithm at hospital i are the secret key K, the pseudorandom function (PRF) F , the dictionary Dict BF i , and the public/private key pair (PK i,1 , SK i ).
For each pseudonym ID i in the dictionary Dict BF i , hospital i connects the entry Dict BF i [ID] to the corresponding Bloom filter (bf IDi ) that is constructed using the genome of patient with pseudonym ID i . If the value of a position pos in the Bloom filter bf IDi (bf IDi [pos]) is non-zero, then that position is extracted and input into the PRF F with the secret key K. The CSP may understand if a patient exists in different hospitals' datasets and obtain more information about the patient in that way. To avoid this, the hospital selects a random string r i and invokes F with the inputs r i and previous outcome of F . Since r i is a uniformly random string, the newly generated result is indistinguishable from a random input. The output is added into a customized Bloom filter cbf IDi . Once all the nonzero elements of the Bloom filter bf IDi are mapped into the customized Bloom filter cbf IDi , the pair(ID i , cbf IDi ) is added into the dictionary Dict CBF i . This process is also shown in Figure 6 . To verify the authenticity of the index, the hospital i digitally signs the hash of the concatenation of PK i,1 and r i by using SK i . The output of the algorithm is a tuple (∆ i , r i , σ i ), where σ i is the signature, r i is the random string applied to build the index, and ∆ i consists of Dict BF i and PK i,1 . 3) Data Encryption (at the hospital) -SNPEncrypt and ASIEncrypt: Data encryption consists of two parts. The first part is the encryption of the genome (i.e., SNPs) and the second part is the ASI encryption. For genome encryption, we propose SNPEncrypt which utilizes the AES encryption algorithm. The input of the algorithm is the secret key K αi and a set S i,SNP of SNPs stored at hospital i. The output is a set C i,SNP of encrypted genomes.
The ASI encryption algorithm at hospital i includes two rounds of AES encryption with two different secret keys (as also shown in Figure 9 in Appendix C). In the first round, the secret key K βi is used and in the second round, a secret key K γi that is randomly selected from the group G T is applied to encrypt the ciphertext from the first round. K βi is held by hospital i and it is only shared with the approved clients. K γi is encrypted using CPABE, which enables the access policy for the ASI. We describe the ASIEncrypt algorithm in the following. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix F.
The input of the algorithm includes two keys K i and K βi and a dictionary Dict ASI i . Each item in the dictionary consists of two components. The first component is the pseudonym of a patient (ID i ) and the second component is a list of ASIs belonging to the patient.
For each pseudonym ID i in the dictionary Dict ASI i , hospital i conducts the following operations. For each pair of ASI and S ASI IDi,SNP inside the Dict ASI i [ID i ], the hospital executes following four steps. First, for each SNP in set S ASI IDi,SNP , the hospital calls the hash function H 2 with a randomly selected value τ and bilinear mapping e(H 1 (v), g 2 ) 1/Ki , where v is the concatenation of SNP.ID and its corresponding value SNP.val. The random value τ enables the hash result h be indistinguishable from a random string. The result h is added into a set θ. Second, the AES encryption algorithm (AES.Enc) is called to encrypt ASI with input key K βi and it outputs the ciphertext C 1 . Third, a key K γi is chosen from G T and AES.Enc is called again to encrypt C 1 with K γi , resulting in ciphertext C 2 . Fourth, the secret key K γi is encrypted using CPABE with policy A built from the set θ. Specifically, all the elements inside θ are considered as attributes of the access policy. The output ciphertext C 3 accompanied with C 2 and τ are added into a ciphertext set C IDi . After all the ASIs of Dict ASI [ID i ] are encrypted, the pair(ID i , C ID i ) is inserted into a dictionary Dict C i . Once this operation is done for all the patients (i.e., all the IDs have been processed), the algorithm outputs the dictionary Dict C i .
4)
Hierarchical index generation (at the CSP) -Hierarchi-calIndexGen: The hierarchical clustering algorithm is designed to cluster the Bloom filters representing the genome sequences into hierarchical clusters. Then, a hierarchical index structure is designed to index all the hierarchical clusters with small memory requirement. The CSP builds hierarchical index based on the received (unclustered) index from each hospital i. The hierarchical index allows to search the target patient efficiently. Figure 7 illustrates the hierarchical index structure and construction of hierarchical customized Bloom filters. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix F.
The key part of the hierarchical clustering algorithm is setting the similarity metric, as it determines the quality of clustering. Instead of using traditional Euclidean distance as the similarity metric, in which one of the dimensions may be relatively large and may overpower the other dimensions, we choose the cosine similarity. Thus, in our protocol, the similarity metric is calculated as Sim(cbf IDi , cbf IDj )= ID7   ID5  ID6   ID1  ID2  ID3  ID4   ID1  ID2  ID3  ID4  ID5  ID6  ID7   cbfID1  cbfID2  cbfID3  cbfID4  cbfID5  cbfID6  cbfID7   cbfID7   cbfID5  cbfID6   bfID1  bfID2  bfID3  bfID4 Tree Dictionary
Hierarchical Customized Bloom filters Hierarchical Index cbfID1 cbfID2 cbfID3 cbfID4 Fig. 7 : Example of index structure and index construction process of hierarchical customized Bloom filters. ID 1 , ID 2 , ID 3 , ID 4 , ID 5 , ID 6 , and ID 7 are pseudonyms, labelling a customized Bloom filter cbf IDi . The customized Bloom filter cbf IDi is either directly or indirectly (colored blue) generated from a Bloom filter (or multiple Bloom filters). For example, cbf ID1 is mapped directly from bf ID1 while cbf ID5 is indirectly mapped from bf ID1 and bf ID2 .
is either 0 or 1. The efficiency of computing the similarity score is enhanced by the bitwise operation.
We use a similarity matrix to keep the pairwise similarity values between different Bloom filters representing genome sequences. Given the similarity matrix, the pairwise distances (i.e., 1-similarity value) can be easily calculated. Then, the multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm [12] is invoked to compute the relative positions of genome sequences. Based on the relative positions, the classic hierarchical clustering algorithm is applied. For this, we use the classic Ward variance minimization algorithm [38] .
We describe the HierarchicalIndexGen algorithm below. The input of the hierarchical clustering algorithm is ∆ i consisting of Dict CBF i , PK i,1 , and r i . The CSP first extracts the dictionary Dict CBF i from ∆ i . Then, the hierarchical clustering algorithm denoted by HC is called with the input Dict CBF i . The outcome consists of a tree structure Tr i and a new dictionary Dict H i . Finally, the tree structure Tr i , dictionary Dict H i , public key PK i,1 , and r i are gathered into a new tuple ∆ H i . In Figure 7 , we provide a toy example illustrating index structure and index construction process of hierarchical customized Bloom filters. We show 4 patients, 7 customized Bloom filters, and 4 standard Bloom filters. The customized Bloom filters, cbf ID1 , cbf ID2 , cbf ID3 , cbf ID4 , are constructed based on the standard Bloom filters (indirectly from patients' genomic data) by the hospital and sent to the CSP. The remaining customized Bloom filters, cbf ID5 , cbf ID6 , cbf ID7 , are generated by the CSP according to the tree structure, where cbf ID5 = cbf ID1 |cbf ID2 , cbf ID6 = cbf ID3 |cbf ID4 , and cbf ID7 = cbf ID5 |cbf ID6 (| represents bitwise OR operation). 5) Index merging (at the CSP) -IndexMerge: The index merging algorithm is invoked by the CSP once a high number of indices are received from different hospitals. The goal is to reconstruct an efficient index to replace all the stored indices without any loss in terms of utility and privacy.
We describe the IndexMerge algorithm in the following. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix F. The CSP first initializes a temporary dictionary Dict temp and a set Υ. Dict temp is applied to store the pair of pseudonym and corresponding customized Bloom filter. The set Υ is used to store pairs including a public key and the corresponding random string. For each index, the CSP resolves it into a tree Tr i , a dictionary Dict CBF i , a public key PK i,1 , and a string r i .
The PK i,1 and r i are collected into the set Υ. Then, each leaf node n of Tr i is read and the value of entry Dict CBF i [n.ID i ] is added into the Dict temp with the entry constructed by the concatenation of n.ID i and r i . The reason of concatenating n.ID i and r i is to avoid the same pseudonym appearing in different hospitals. After all the indices are processed, the CSP runs hierarchical clustering algorithm HC over the Dict temp and outputs the new tree structure Tr M and dictionary Dict BF M . The output of the algorithm is a merged index MI consisting of Υ, Tr M , and Dict CBF M .
C. Client Authorization
Upon a hospital i receives an authorization request from a client, the hospital makes a decision on whether to allow its genomic data to be accessed or not. If the hospital approves the request, a shared key is generated and sent to the CSP and a success message is sent back to the client along with the keys K and K βi . Otherwise, a failure message is sent to the client. The shared key is used by the CSP to transform the client's query token into a searchable token over ASI. We describe the shared key generation algorithm in the following. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix G. The input of the algorithm includes two keys K i and K c and a set S i,SNP of SNPs. K i and S i,SNP are from hospital i, while K c is from client c. S i,SNP is the set of SNPs that the hospital allows the client to access. The hospital generates the first part of the shared key (δ i ) by computing g Kc/Ki 2 . Then, for each SNP in S i,SNP , the hospital executes the following two procedures. First, the hash function H 1 is invoked with the input SNP and the hash result is raised to the power 1/K c . Second, the previous outcome is added into a customized Bloom filter cbf i . The final output is the shared key consisting of two parts: δ i and cbf i .
D. Query Processing
As shown in Figure 4 , query processing includes: query generation (QueryGen and TokenGen), search (Search, Sera-chOverMergedIndex, TokenAdjust, ASISearch), and decryption (ASIDecrypt).
1) Query generation -QueryGen and TokenGen: Query generation is executed by a client. It consists of two algorithms, QueryGen and TokenGen. The outcome of the QueryGen is used to search over indices of target pseudonyms, while the outcome of the TokenGen is used to search over the encrypted ASIs.
QueryGen algorithm is detailed in Appendix H. The input of the algorithm for a client c consists of the secret key K, a set S c,SNP of SNPs, a threshold ε c representing the minimum number of matching SNPs for a successful search, and a parameter k c to specify the threshold for the maximum number of retrieved pseudonyms. Each pair of SNP.ID and SNP.val inside S c,SNP is concatenated and added into a Bloom filter bf c . The procedure is same as the process in index generation (as in Section V-B2). For each non-zero element inside the bf c , the position pos is extracted and computed by calling F using the secret key K as the input. The output is added into a set E. The threshold ε c is set by computing the number of non-zero bits caused by the minimum number of SNPs. That is, count |S| · ε c , where count is the total number of non-zero bits caused by the input SNPs and |S| is the total number of input SNPs. The final form of the output is a tuple (E, ε c , k c , σ i ), where signature σ i is generated by the hospital i and sent to an approved client.
The details of the TokenGen algorithm are given in Appendix H. The input of the TokenGen algorithm includes a secret key K c and a set S c,SNP of SNPs. For each SNP inside S c,SNP , a hash function H 1 is called and the hash result is raised to the power 1/K c for encryption and future token adjustment. Each outcome is collected into a set TK. Finally, the algorithm outputs TK.
Eventually, the query sent to the CSP consists of the outputs of algorithms QueryGen and TokenGen.
2) Search over a single index -Search: The search algorithm is run by the CSP. For clarity of the presentation, we first consider a scenario in which the search algorithm runs over a single index (belonging to a single hospital). The search algorithm only uses the first part Q of the query (encrypted input SNPs E to traverse the index from the root to the leaves considering the minimum similarity threshold ε c . The details are explained as follows (the details of Search algorithm are also given in Appendix H).
The CSP receives a query Q from a client c and an index (∆ i , r i ) from a hospital i. The CSP first resolves ∆ i into a tree Tr i , a dictionary Dict H i (which consists of pairs of patient pseudonym and corresponding customized Bloom filter), and a public key PK i,1 . Query Q is resolved into a set E, a signature σ i , and two threshold values ε c and k c . Then, the CSP builds a dictionary Dict with only k c entries. The dictionary Dict stores pairs including (i) patient pseudonym and (ii) similarity score between corresponding patient's customized Bloom filter and the queried genome's customized Bloom filter.
Afterwards, the CSP verifies σ i by running the verification function verify with the inputs PK i,1 , σ i , and H(PK i,1 , r i ). If the verification fails, the process is terminated. Otherwise, the CSP continues to execute the following procedures. For each element ζ 1 in the set E, the CSP runs F with the inputs ζ 1 and r i . The outcome ζ 2 is added into a customized Bloom filter cbf c . After completing the above process, the CSP reads the root (root i ) from Tr i and pushes it into the queue qu.
Following steps are recursively executed until the qu is empty. First, a node (n) is popped out from the qu. Second, the similarity score sim is computed by using the cosine similarity between Dict[n.ID i ] and cbf c . If sim is less than ε c , then the next step is skipped and step one is invoked again. If sim is greater than or equal to ε c , the property of n is checked. If n is a leaf, we call the insert function (Insert) with the inputs Dict, n.ID i , and sim. The details of Insert are given in Appendix H. The purpose of Insert function is to insert the pair (ID i , sim) into Dict if Dict is not full or there exits a pair that has smaller similarity score compared to the current node. If n is not a leaf and there exists a left child (leftchild), then leftchild is pushed into qu. If its right child (rightchild) exits, then rightchild is pushed into qu. After this iteration is completed, the CSP outputs the final result Dict.
3) Search over a merged index -SerachOverMergedIndex:
Compared to searching over a single index, searching over a merged index mainly differs in two aspects. First, the CSP verifies all the signatures submitted by the client instead of a single one (to recognize which hospitals in the merged index authorize the search). Second, each random string attached to an authorized index is used to generate a customized Bloom filter based on the submitted query.
We describe the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm in the following. The details of the algorithm are also given in Appendix H. The input of the SerachOverMergedIndex al-gorithm is a merged index and a query Q from a client c. The query Q includes a set E of encrypted SNPs, a set σ s of signatures, and two thresholds ε c and k c . The merged index is resolved into a set Υ, a tree structure Tr M , and a dictionary Dict BF M . For each signature σ i ∈ σ s , the CSP verifies whether there exists a pair (PK i,1 , r i ) ∈ Υ that matches verify(PK i,1 , σ i , H(PK i,1 , r i )) = True. For each pair of (PK i,1 , r i ) that matches the verification, the random string r i is extracted and input into F with each ζ 1 in E. The output ζ 2 of F is added into the customized Bloom filter cbf c . If the customized Bloom filter is empty, it means no submitted signature is valid and the algorithm returns None. Otherwise, cbf c is used to search over the tree Tr M . The process is similar to algorithm Search in Section V-D2 (details are shown in Appendix H). The only difference is that the Insert function is replaced by InsertConditionally. The details of InsertConditionally are given in Appendix H. Compared with Insert, the difference is that in the InsertConditionally algorithm, the input pseudonym ID i is the concatenation of a real patient pseudonym and a random string that is required to be inside the authorized set. The extra operation is to verify the legitimacy of the record and to guarantee that all the records stored in Dict are authorized. Finally, the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm outputs Dict.
4)
Token adjustment -TokenAdjust: The token received from the client is not directly applicable for search over the ASI ciphertext. The CSP needs to use a shared key to transform the received token into an executable token (see Appendix H for details). The input of the TokenAdjust algorithm consists of a set of tokens (TK) and a shared key (δ i , cbf i ) from a hospital i. For each token tk in TK, the membership evaluation is conducted over the customized Bloom filter cbf i . If cbf i (tk) = False, the bilinear mapping algorithm e is called with inputs tk and δ i . The result is collected into a set TK * . Otherwise, the current round of tk is skipped. Finally, the algorithm outputs TK * , which can be used to search the target ASIs. 5) ASI search -ASISearch: Given executable tokens (for search) and ciphertext, the CSP can proceed with ASI search. To identify an ASI, the tokens must match the access policy set on the ASI. The access policy is set in the granularity of SNPs. For example, ASIs related to the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer are encrypted by considering the SNPs of BRCA gene as required attributes. In detail, these attributes are applied to construct a polynomial that outputs the value of a target parameter (secret key) when all the required attributes are satisfied.
The details of ASI search are also given in Appendix H. The input of the ASI search algorithm includes a set TK * of executable tokens, a set ð of pseudonyms of patient records obtained from index search, a dictionary Dict C i containing pseudonym and ASI ciphertext pairs, and a master key MK i of CPABE. For each pseudonym ID i in ð, the entry Dict ASI [ID i ] associcates ciphertexts C 2 , C 3 and a random string τ .
To decrypt ciphertext C 2 , the secret key (sk) of CPABE is generated as follows. For each token tk * in TK * , the hash function H 2 is called with the inputs τ and tk * . The result is gathered into a set ϑ. Then, the key generation algorithm CPABE.KeyGen is called with the master key MK i of CPABE and ϑ. If the attribute set ϑ does not match the access policy, the newly generated sk is null and following operations are skipped. Otherwise, the following procedures are executed to open the first layer of ciphertext C 2 . The decryption algorithm (CPABE.Decrypt) of CPABE is invoked with the inputs sk and C 3 . If the output symmetric key K γi is not null, the decryption algorithm AES.Decrypt of AES is invoked with inputs K γi and C 2 . The output C 1 is collected into a set C C1 . Once all the elements inside ð are accessed, the search algorithm outputs the set C C1 that will be sent to the client. 6) ASI decryption -ASIDecrypt: Upon receiving the search result, the client applies its secret key to decrypt the ciphertext of ASI. For each ciphertext of retrieved result C C1 , the decryption algorithm of AES is invoked to decrypt the ciphertext with the input secret key K βi assigned by a hospital i. The plaintext ASI is gathered into a set S ASI . After all the ciphertext is decrypted, the algorithm outputs S ASI . The details of this operation are also given in Appendix H.
VI. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, based on the threat model described in Section IV-B, we formally define the "leakage function" to capture the information that an adversary is allowed to learn. Afterwards, we define the experiments of index and ASI privacy against the defined attacks. Finally, we prove that our scheme meets the privacy goals.
A. Leakage Function
The leakage function plays an important role in the privacy analysis as it defines the information that is allowed to be acquired by the adversary. Following previous work [13] , [18] , [41] , we consider the following as the allowed leaked information: (i) the size pattern, (ii) search pattern, and (iii) access pattern. The size pattern includes the size of encrypted query, encrypted genomic sequences, encrypted index, and encrypted ASI. The search pattern represents the relationship between a query and the retrieved result. The access pattern represents the access path to certain data records. To define the leakage function formally, we first present the formal definitions of the aforementioned patterns. Size pattern (µ): Let C SNP ={C 1,SNP , · · · , C n,SNP }, C ASI ={C 1,ASI ,· · · , C n,ASI }, and C ind ={(∆ 1 , σ 1 ), · · · , (∆ m , σ m ) } be the ciphertexts of genome sequences, ASI, and index stored at the CSP, respectively (where n is the total number of records stored in the CSP and m is the total number of indices). Also, let Q and TK be the client's query for the index and token of ASI, respectively. The size pattern is defined as µ={|C SNP |, |C ASI |, |C ind |, |Q|, |TK|}. Search pattern (ν): Let {q 1 , · · · , q p } be p consecutive queries and {S 1,ASI · · · , S q,ASI } be the corresponding retrieved ASIs. Then, ν is defined as a two dimensional matrix and ν[i, j] = 1 if a retrieved ASI exists in the jth position of the patient i's record. Access pattern (ξ): Let C ind be the set of encrypted indices and C ASI be the set of encrypted ASIs at the CSP. Let {S 1,ASI · · · , S q,ASI } be ASIs retrieved by queries {q 1 = (Q 1 , TK 1 ), · · · , q p = (Q p , TK p )}. Then, the access pattern is defined as ξ={(C ind (Q 1 ), C ASI (C ind (Q 1 ), TK 1 ), S 1,ASI ), · · · , (C ind (Q p ), C ASI (C ind (Q p ), TK p ), S p,ASI ) }.
The leakage function captures the leakage of the above defined patterns and it is defined as follows. Leakage function (L): Let C SNP , C ind , C ASI , and q = (Q, TK) be the encrypted genome sequences, encrypted index, encrypted ASIs, and a query, respectively. The leakage function is defined as L = {C SNP , C ind , C ASI , Q, TK, µ, ν, ξ}. The output of L is the revealed bits that are not supposed to be disclosed.
The leakage function L is used to control the information leakage of allowed requests (e.g., query request).
B. Privacy Definition
The privacy of the proposed scheme consists of two components. The first is the privacy of genomic data and the second is the privacy of ASI. Privacy of genomic data can be further split into index privacy and privacy of genome sequences. Genome sequences are encrypted using AES and they are not involved in the query processing. Thus, their privacy relies on the robustness of AES. Since AES encryption achieves semantic security (e.g., CBC and CTR modes [28] ), the encrypted genome sequences are robust against chosen plaintext attacks. The index privacy depends on the probability of reversing the customized Bloom filter to obtain the genome sequences using the information from the query execution and analyzing the customized Bloom filter. We will analyze this in detail next.
Considering the privacy of ASI, each ASI is encrypted by AES two times. The key for the first AES encryption is only shared between a hospital and legitimate clients. The key for the second AES encryption is encrypted using CPABE, which enforces the fine-grained access control on the ASIs. Consequently, the privacy of ASI depends on the probability of breaking AES and CPABE simultaneously by query processing and ciphertext analysis. We will also analyze this in detail.
1) Privacy of Genomic Data: We formulate the privacy of genomic data as a game between a challenger and an adversary, which includes both privacy of index and genome sequence. First, the adversary selects two datasets DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P of SNPs. Each item of dataset DB i,SN P (i ∈ {0, 1}) includes two components: patient pseudonym and corresponding SNPs of the patient. Then, the adversary sends the two databases to the challenger. The adversary is allowed to send adaptive queries with constraint on the information leakage before making the final decision about which dataset is utilized by the challenger.
Let Π SN P ={Setup, IndexGen, QueryGen, IndexMerge, Search, SearchOverMergedIndex} be a set of algorithms of the proposed scheme that are related to genomic data privacy. For a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary Adv , the advantage function ADV Π SN P Adv is defined as follows.
, where b and b * are defined in the following game which evaluates the probability of breaking the proposed scheme. We describe the key steps of the game between the challenger and the adversary below. Init: The adversary Adv submits two datasets DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P to the challenger with the same number of records and index structure. Setup: The challenger generates the initial functions, parameters, and keys. Details can be found in Section V-B. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to obtain the ciphertexts of genome, index, and query by adapatively submitting ciphertext requests, index requests, and query requests to the challenger. Ciphertext request: The adversary selects a dataset of genome sequence and submits it to the challenger to request its ciphertext. The selected dataset is not limited to DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P . Index request: The adversary selects a dataset that is different from DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P and submits it to the challenger to request its index. Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b from {0, 1} and encrypts DB b,SN P to generate C b,SN P . It also generates encrypted index C ind b and sends C b,SN P and C ind b to the adversary. Phase 2: The adversary adaptively submits query request Q in addition to the ciphertext and index requests described in the Phase 1. Query request: The adversary selects target SNPs, sets two thresholds, attaches the signature of target index, and sends them to the challenger for asking the query with constraint L(S 0,SN P , Q, C ind0 ) = L(S 1,SN P , Q, C ind1 ). Guess: The adversary A outputs b * as a guess of b.
The privacy of the genomic data is preserved against selective chosen plaintext attack if in the above scheme Π SN P the adversary Adv has negligible advantage. Explicitly, the advantage function ADV Π SN P Adv should be a negligible function in parameter λ.
2) Privacy of ASI: Similar to privacy of genomic data, we also define the privacy of ASI via a game between a challenger and the adversary. In a nutshell, the adversary sends two ASIs to a challenger and the adversary sends adaptive queries with constraint on the leakage function before providing its guess of the applied ASI. The formal definition of this game is in Appendix D.
C. Privacy Proof
In this section, we analyse the privacy of the proposed scheme. For the proof of genomic data privacy, we show that in the genomic data privacy game (in Section VI-B1), DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P are indistinguishable for a PPT adversary. Theorem 1. The scheme Π SN P is privacy-preserving if no PPT adversary can distinguish DB 0,SN P from DB 1,SN P with non-negligible advantage at the end of the game defined in Section VI-B1.
It is easy to verify that the above theorem is consistent with the privacy definition of genomic data.
Theorem 2. A PPT adversary is unable to distinguish the view of DB 0,SN P from the view of DB 1,SN P in the game defined in Section VI-B1 if the applied AES encryption mode (e.g., CBC and CTR) is semantically-secure and PRF is indistinguishable from a random function.
We provide the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix E. According to Theorems 1 and 2, we conclude that the scheme Π SN P is privacy-preserving. The privacy of the ASI can be also proved similarly (i.e., by showing the indistinguishably of ASI 0 and ASI 1 from adversary's point of view).
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency and scalability of the proposed scheme. Since the memory mapping technique [26] , [19] , [27] is widely applied in our implementation of the proposed scheme (e.g., small part of the index is stored in memory and the remaining is stored on the disk), a stable memory address is required to measure the memory usage for different scenarios. Due to this requirement, we first conducted experiments on a single machine to show the efficiency of the proposed scheme and to analyze the run-time under different scenarios. Due to the resource constraints of a single machine, we then turned to Amazon EC2 platform [1] for running large-scale experiments to show the scalability of the proposed scheme. In all experiments, the length of security parameter of RSA signature is set to 1024 bits, symmetric key of AES is set to 256 bits, the asymmetric curve used in bilinear mapping is set to MNT224, the symmetric curve applied in CPABE is set to SS512, the capacity of Bloom filter is set to 2 21 , and maximum false positive rate of the Bloom filter is set to 0.01. Also, in all experiments, we generated each query by setting the threshold for the minimum number of matching SNPs (ε c ) to 90 percent of the total input SNPs and the threshold for the number of retrieved results (k c ) to 5. In addition, the number of SNPs in a query is equal to the number of SNPs per patient, if not specified otherwise. The client is assumed to be authorized to access all the hospitals' data. Finally, we run each experiment 10 times and report on the average performance.
A. Experiments on a Single Local Machine
We first describe the dataset generation and then we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed mechanism. We also compare the proposed scheme with existing work by Wang et al. [37] and Asharov et al. [5] . We ran the single machine experiments using a computer with Ubuntu system, i7 CPU, 32GB RAM, and 500GB hard disk.
1) Data Model: We used the rsnps tool [4] to obtain all the raw patient files from the publicly available OpenSNP dataset [2]. The whole dataset includes 3477 individuals and its plaintext size is 55GB. We first converted the raw patient files into VCF format using an open source software personalgenome-analysis [23] . Eventually, we ended up with 2850 valid VCF files. For the affiliated sensitive information (ASI), we also used the OpenSNP dataset [2]. In total, we collected 7388 ASIs and we randomly assigned them to the patients in varying numbers. The number of SNPs associated to an ASI varies from 20 to 2000.
2) Results: Due to the setting of the Bloom filter and thresholds, we do not have any loss in terms of the accuracy of the algorithm, and hence we do not show the accuracy results in the following experiments. We first evaluated the proposed mechanism when a hospital has 10, 100, 1000, and 2850 patients and each patient has 20 SNPs. The results are shown in Table II . We observed that the time cost of QueryGen is constant, while the time costs of IndexGen and Search increases linearly with the increasing patient records. Furthermore, the growth rate of the time cost of HierarchicalIndexGen is approximately equal to the square of the growth rate of the patient records. In addition, the memory and disk storage requirements increase linearly with the number of patients.
Then, we considered the scenario that includes a hospital with 2850 patients and each patient having 200, 2000, and 3350221 SNPs (whole sequence), respectively. The results are shown in Table III . We observed that the time costs of IndexGen and QueryGen algorithms increase almost linearly with the increasing number of SNPs per patient. We also observed that the time costs of Search and HierarchicalIndexGen algorithms do not strongly correlate to the number of SNPs per patient; there is only slight increase in time cost when the number of SNPs increases dramatically. The index size is independent of number of SNPs. However, the size of the query increases linearly with the increasing number of used SNPs. Next, we evaluated the index merging algorithm with 100, 200, 280, and 500 hospitals. Each hospital is assigned with 10 patients and each patient has 20 SNPs. The results are shown in Table IV . Notably, we observed that the time cost of IndexMerge algorithm increases quadratically with the increasing number of hospitals. As discussed, the benefit of applying the IndexMerge algorithm is to reduce the search time (i.e., to search over a merged index of multiple hospitals rather than searching over separate indices of individual hospitals). To justify this, we analyzed and compared the time costs of the Search and SearchOverMergeIndex algorithms. Table IV shows that the time cost of Search algorithm increases linearly with the increasing number of hospitals while the time cost of SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm increases sub-linearly. When the number of hospitals reaches 100, the SearchOver-MergedIndex algorithm has significant advantage compared to the Search algorithm.
We also compared the proposed mechanism with the state-of-the-art, including Wang et al.'s [37] and Asharov et al.'s [5] schemes. We did the comparison on a single hospital's dataset (as compliant with the settings in [37] and [5] ), in which the number of patients is 2850, the number of SNPs per patient is 3350221 (the whole sequence), and the query includes all 3350221 SNPs. We first implemented Wang et al.'s scheme [37] including (i) protocol one, which includes a bucketing technique to improve the secure computation of set difference size and (ii) protocol two, which replaces the square operation of protocol one with an estimation of normal distribution. We show the results in Table V . We observed that our proposed scheme performs almost 63 times faster than the best case of protocol two of Wang et al.'s scheme. Moreover, our scheme provides higher accuracy than [37] . Next, we compared the proposed scheme with Asharov et al.'s scheme [5] using the performance numbers reported in [37] . k and l are the number of iterations and adopted hash functions respectively. [5] increases linearly with the number of SNPs in the query while the run-time of our proposed scheme remains constant. For example, when the number of SNPs in the query reaches to 3350221, the query time of Asharov et al.'s scheme is at least 1125 seconds, which is almost 97 times slower than our proposed scheme. Next, we evaluated the performance of ASI sharing focusing on a single ASI with 20, 200, and 2000 associated SNPs, respectively. We first assumed that the index search result only contains one pseudonym and each patient record only contains one ASI. The results are shown in the Table VII. We observed that the time costs of Encrypt, SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, TokenAdjust, and ASISearch algorithms increase linearly with the increasing number of associated SNPs with the ASI. On the other hand, the time cost of ASIDecrypt algorithm is almost constant with increasing number of SNPs.
Finally, we considered a more general case in which each patient has different number of ASIs, each having 20 associated SNPs. The result are shown in Table VIII . We observed that with increasing number of ASIs, the time costs of SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, TokenAdjust, and ASIDecrypt algorithms are almost constant. Also, the time costs of Encrypt and ASISearch algorithms increase linearly with increasing number of ASIs. 
B. Experiments on Amazon EC2
To show the scalability of our scheme, we also conducted experiments on Amazon EC2 platform [1] and especially evaluated the QueryGen, Search, IndexMerge, and SearchOver-MergedIndex algorithms.
1) Data Model: Using genomic data of 2850 patients (from OpenSNP dataset [2]), we extracted the statistics of the observed SNPs. Using these statistics, we synthetically generated 10000 patients. In detail, we first assigned SNP IDs to 10000 patient records based on the extracted distribution. Then, again following the extracted statistics, we assigned a SNP value for each SNP of each patient record. We then assigned the generated patients to 100 hospitals, and hence each hospital has 100 patient records. In the following experiments, we first built the index for each hospital. The index is built based on all the SNPs (the maximum is around 3350221) of each patient record.
2) Results: First, we evaluated the performance of the initialization phase which includes the IndexGen and Hierar-chialIndexGen algorithms. We observed that the time cost for IndexGen is 742.51 seconds and time cost for hierarchicalIn-dexGen is 896.93 seconds for each hospital.
In Figure 8a , we show the performance of the QueryGen algorithm for different number of SNPs in the query. We observed that the time cost of QueryGen increases slightly with increasing number of SNPs in the query. We then evaluated the time cost of the Search algorithm and observed (in Figure 8a ) that search time increases linearly with increasing number of SNPs in the query.
Next, in Figure 8b , we show the performance of the IndexMerge algorithm. We observed that the time cost of the IndexMerge algorithm increases superlinearly with increasing number of indices. Finally, in Figure 8 , we show the time cost of the SearchOverMergedIndex algorithm with different number of merged indices and SNPs in the query. We observed that the number of SNPs has a slight impact on the search efficiency compared to the number of indices. Moreover, we observed that when the number of indices reaches to 50, the time cost of sequentially calling Search requires at least 170 seconds, while the maximum time cost of SearchOverMergedIndex is 166 seconds. This also supports the experimental result from the local machine, which shows 100 indices are enough to benefit from the index merging process.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we briefly discuss the evaluation results, potential application of the proposed scheme, limitations of the proposed scheme, and future research directions. 
A. Evaluation Results
In general, we observe that the experimental results (in Section VII) on a single machine and Amazon EC2 are consistent. In addition, we observe that the search process benefits from merging process when the number of indices (e.g., hospitals) exceeds a certain number (50 in our large-scale experiments). Based on the results of the evaluation, we show that the proposed scheme is scalable with respect to increasing number of hospitals, number of patients per hospital, number of SNPs per patient, and number of ASIs per patient. We also show the superiority of the proposed scheme with respect to the state-of-the-art in terms of its practicality. In particular, we show that the proposed scheme has significant advantage for scenarios that include large number of SNPs per patient and large number of SNPs in the query.
B. Alternative Usecases
The proposed scheme can also be used in existing health-related online social networks. For instance, the wellknown online health information exchange platform Patients-LikeMe [3] (PLM) already attracts more than 0.6 million members including physicians, researchers, and patients. Currently PLM includes only the ASI (phenotype, ethnicity, disease conditions, treatment, etc.) of its members. However, it is not very far fetched to assume that such a platform also starts storing genomic data of its members in the near future. PLM is a popular website even among physicians to learn about the treatment procedures of other physicians. Using our proposed scheme, genomes of individuals can be kept encrypted at the PLM. PLM can index such genomes and let the physicians conduct privacy-preserving similar patient tests on them. As a result of the test, the PLM can connect the physicians of the corresponding patients so they can exchange information about their patients. Similarly, using the proposed scheme, and assuming a cloud-based genomics service provider (such as Google Genomics) act as the CSP, research labs and hospitals that keep their data on the cloud can query each other's databases in a privacy-preserving way.
C. Limitations and Future Research Directions
In the proposed scheme, if the CSP and one of the participating hospitals collude, the CSP may launch a brute-force attack to infer the SNPs contained in the indices of other hospitals. In this paper, we do not consider such a collusion. In future work, we will make the proposed scheme robust against such a collusion by using different secret keys to generate different indices instead of a shared secret key. Meanwhile, we will allow hospitals to generate a shared key to support the ciphertext search across the hospitals.
The proposed scheme currently supports sequential ASI search for each patient. In the scenario that a patient has a high number of ASIs, sequential search becomes time-consuming. To optimise this search process, we will design an efficient index structure for the ASIs.
Also, in future work, we will focus on supporting dynamic datasets. We will extend the proposed scheme to efficiently handle additions or updates in the datasets of hospitals without indexing the whole dataset from the beginning. Furthermore, we will extend our scheme to support batch search. In the current version, the client has to submit all the queries oneby-one. In future work, we will integrate many queries into one query without compromising from the accuracy.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a privacy-preserving and efficient solution for the similar patient search problem among several hospitals. To achieve this, we have proposed a novel privacy-preserving index structure. To improve the efficiency of the search operation, we have developed a hierarchical index structure (to index each hospital's dataset with low memory requirement) and a novel privacy-preserving index merging mechanism that generates a common search index from individual indices of each hospital. We have also considered the search for medical information (e.g., diagnosis and treatment) that is associated with genomic data of a patient. We have developed a scheme that allows access to this information via a fine-grained access control policy. Via simulations on real and synthetic genomic data, we have shown the practicality and efficiency of the proposed scheme. We believe that the proposed scheme will further facilitate the use of genomic data in clinical settings and pave the way for personalized medicine.
APPENDIX

A. Background on Cryptographic Tools
Here, we provide background on more common cryptographic tools such as asymmetric bilinear groups and Bloom filter.
1) Asymmetric Bilinear Groups: Let G 1 and G 2 be two distinct groups of prime order p and g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a function which maps two elements from G 1 and G 2 to a target group G T of prime order p. The tuple (G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, e) is an asymmetric bilinear group if following properties hold: (a) the group operations in G 1 , G 2 , G T can be computed efficiently. Fig. 9 : Overview of ASI encryption. ASI is first encrypted using AES encryption and secret key K βi to obtain C 1 . Then, C 1 is encrypted using AES and with secret key K γi to obtain C 2 . Finally, K γi is encrypted to C 3 by using CPABE.
(b) e can be computed efficiently. (c) e is non-degenerate: e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
(d) e is bilinear: for all a, b ∈ Z p , e(g a 1 , g b 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) ab . 2) Bloom Filter: A Bloom filter is a bit array used to efficiently check the existence of an element in a set [11] . At the beginning, all the values of the array elements are set to 0. There exists a family of k different hash functions, each function mapping a data item to a position inside the array. Consequently, each data item is represented by k non-zero bits inside the bit array. Even if a data item has not been mapped to the bit array, there is still a probability for the k corresponding bits to be non-zero because of the other data items represented in the array. Such a situation is called "false positive". Let m be the length of the bit array and n be the number of distinct data items mapped to the array. The false positive probability is expressed as (1 − e −(kn) m ) k , and it gets the smallest value when k = ln 2 m n .
B. System's Core Procedures
We provide the cores procedures of the proposed scheme in Table IX .
C. Illustration of ASI Encryption Process
We discuss the ASI encryption process in Section V-B3. We show an illustration of ASI encryption in Figure 9 .
D. Details of the Game Representing the ASI Privacy
Informally, the ASI privacy is defined as a game in which the adversary sends two ASIs to a challenger and the adversary sends adaptive queries with constraint on the leakage function before providing its guess of the applied ASI. The formal definition is defined as follows.
Let Π ASI ={Setup, ASIEncrypt, SharedKeyGen, TokenGen, TokenAdjust, ASISearch, ASIDecrypt} be a set of algorithms of the proposed scheme that are related to ASIs. For a PPT adversary Adv , the advantage of wining the game is defined as ADV Π ASI Adv = P r(b * = b) − 1 2 , where b * and b are defined in the following game. Init: The adversary selects ASI 0 and ASI 1 with same size and number of associated SNPs and submits them to the challenger. Setup: The challenger runs Setup to start the system with initial functions, parameters, and keys. Details can be found in Section V-B. Phase 1: The adversary adaptively submits requests in one of the following types: Ciphertext request: The adversary submits an ASI associated to a set of specified SNPs and requests for its ciphertext. The selected ASI is not limited to the previously uploaded two ASIs. Token request: The adversary submits a set of SNPs and requests the corresponding search token. Shared key request: The adversary submits a set of SNPs and requests for a shared key with constraint that the shared key can decrypt either both ASI 0 and ASI 1 or none of them. Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b from {0, 1} and encrypts ASI b by calling function ASIEncrypt before sending the result to the adversary. Phase 2: The adversary repeats Phase 1. Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b * for b.
We claim the scheme Π ASI is privacy-preserving against selective chosen plaintext attack if the PPT adversary Adv has negligible advantage in winning the above game.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: We prove Theorem 2 by assuming if there exists an adversary Adv that can distinguish the two views of DB 0,SN P and DB 1,SN P , then there exists a simulator B that can break either the semantic security of AES encryption or the randomness of PRF. In the following, we follow the previously defined game (in Section VI-B1) with a simulator B trying to break the proposed scheme. Init: A simulator B selects and submits two datasets of genome sequences DB * 0,SN P and DB * 1,SN P to the adversary Adv and challenger with same number of records and index structure. Setup: The challenger runs Setup to set initial parameters and functions. Phase 1: The adversary adaptively submits one of the following requests to the simulator B. Ciphertexts request: B directly submits the dataset from adversary to the challenger and sends the ciphertext from the challenger to the adversary. The dataset is not limited to DB * 0,SN P and DB * 1,SN P . Index request: The simulator B directly sends the submitted dataset to the challenger and sends the returned index from the challenger back to the adversary A. The submitted dataset is not among DB * 0,SN P and DB * 1,SN P . Challenge: The challenger randomly selects a bit b and generates the ciphertext and index of DB * b,SN P by invoking SNPEncrypt and IndexGen, respectively. The challenger sends the newly generated ciphertext and index to the simulator B. The simulator B sends them to the adversary. Phase 2: The adversary submits the following query request to simulator B in addition to repeating the Phase 1. Query request: Simulator B uploads the submitted query request to the challenger and sends the result back to the adversary. Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b * to the simulator B and the simulator B outputs the same guess.
According to the initial assumption, the adversary Adv has significant advantage in breaking the defined experiment in Section VI-B1. In the proof, the described experiment strictly follows the defined experiment, and hence the simulator B IX: System's Core Procedures. The first column includes the names of the APIs. The inputs and outputs of the APIs are shown in columns 2 and 3. The last column represents the corresponding module of the API in Figures 2, 3 , and 4. The value of the last column consists of two parts. The first part (before dot) represents the number of the corresponding figure and the second part represents the number of the module in the figure.
API Call
Input Output Steps in Figure 2, 3 has significant advantage in guessing the correct answer. Thus, the simulator B can distinguish the ciphertext C * 0,SN P and index C * ind0 from C * 1,SN P and index C * ind1 with significant advantage in the experiment. Since C * b,SN P is the ciphertext obtained from AES encryption and index C * ind b is the output of a PRF, the simulator B successfully breaks one of them if the simulator B cannot learn significant information from the ciphertext request, index request, and query request.
First, we analyse the ciphertext request. Since each ciphertext is generated as a result of AES encryption, the security is guaranteed by the robustness of AES. According to the assumption, the adopted AES achieves semantic security and the simulator B cannot learn significant information from the ciphertext. Second, the index request is only applicable to the datasets that are different from the challenged datasets. Moreover, each index is randomized by a random string, and hence the simulator B cannot correlate any two different indices. Third, the query request is constrained by the leakage function. The request will be released if and only if the request causes the same leakage of two challenged datasets. As the leakage is the same, the simulator B cannot learn significant information to distinguish the challenged ciphertext and index. Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that in the above experiment, the simulator B should break either the AES encryption or the randomness of PRF.
F. Details of the Algorithms in the Initialisation Phase in Section V-B
Here, we provide the details of the algorithms introduced in the initialization phase of the proposed scheme (in Section V-B). We show the details of the index generation, ASI encryption, hierarchical clustering, and index merging in Algorithms 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
G. Details of the Algorithms in the Client Authorization Phase in Section V-C
Here, we provide the details of the algorithm to generate a shared key in the client authorization phase of the proposed scheme. The detail to generate a shared key is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 1 IndexGen
Input: a secret key K of PRF, dictionary Dict BF i , public key PK i,1 of signature, private key SK i,1 of signature Output: a pair ∆ i of dictionary and public key, random string r i , and signature σ i 1: initialize a dictionary Dict CBF Here, we provide the details of the algorithms introduced in the query processing phase of the proposed scheme (in Section V-D). We show the details of query generation, token generation, search conducted on a single index, and the Insert function in Algorithms 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. We also show the detailed steps of search over a merged index, InsertConditionally function, and token adjustment in Algorithms 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Finally, we show the details of ASI search and ASI decryption in Algorithms 13 and 14.
